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A PRACTITIONER'S COMMENTARY ON THE
ACTUAL USE OF AMENDED RULE 11
REMARKS OF MEL VYN L WEISS*
Before I get into my intended comments, I would like to address Judge
Duffy's remarks. I enjoy hearing Judge Duffy because I know he is sin-
cere and intelligent, although I sometimes disagree with him. He be-
lieves in what he stands for even though he knows that others may
disagree with him. But nevertheless, he asserts his position, and usually
in a very forceful manner. Sometimes he even takes a position, as a
judge, knowing that he may be in disagreement with the Circuit Court of
Appeals, presumably a jurisdiction to which he is beholden. But as a
judge with strong feelings and strong beliefs, he stakes out his position
irrespective of what the circuit court may do. I respect that. There are
others, however, who would disagree with a district court rendering deci-
sions without giving more regard to what the higher court may do. I
don't agree with that view and apparently neither does Judge Duffy.
So too there are lawyers who have strong beliefs, and are willing to
present them in spite of long odds against their views being accepted.
Lawyers are trained to be creative and to be aggressive for their clients.
It is that process that brings about meaningful changes in the law,
changes which society requires in order to move forward. Unfortunately,
I believe Rule 11 may stifle this evolutionary process. If lawyers become
inhibited because of concern over the imposition of sanctions, we all be-
come losers.
I most resent Rule 11 because it pits lawyer against lawyer in a very
unseemly way, in the wrong arena, and in a public spectacle."2 I travel
all over the country and I see all kinds of lawyers from all kinds of back-
grounds. They are not all brilliant, they are not all successful and some-
times their judgments may even be wrong. But for the most part, and
with very few exceptions, they take their responsibility to their client
very seriously. If they err, it is because they may take those responsibili-
ties too seriously. Sure they are aggressive, but usually not for their own
pocketbooks. Very few lawyers with whom I have had contact think in
terms of pocketbook issues when they take positions in court. They do it
because they have sincere beliefs in their arguments, and in their fiduci-
ary duty to get a proper result for their client. To characterize these
actions in the terms that we have just heard, I think is not fair.
As I stated at one of the luncheons, the judicial system requires a co-
* Partner, Milberg Weiss Bershad Specthrie & Lerach.
122. See Patton, New Rules Intended to Streamline Pretrial Process, Legal Times, May
16, 1983, at 17, coL 2; Vairo, supra note 1, at 65. But see Schwarzer, supra note 77, at
183-84 (rejecting some of these concerns).
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operative atmosphere among lawyers.123 Settlement is the most effective
and cheapest way to get rid of a case; and without having settlements in
the percentages that we do I don't think it would be possible for the
judicial system to work. What Rule 11 does is inject in an atmosphere
that is already a hostile one, an additional adversarial proceeding that
will only exacerbate that hostility and reduce the possibilities for settle-
ment. Professionals have to control emotions, they have to calm their
clients, they have to interact with one another and they have to present
themselves to the court, sometimes aggressively but always in control.
When you get into this Rule 11 business, it creates an atmosphere that
too easily causes the lawyers to lose control. It is very difficult to be
attacked by another lawyer with respect to veracity and competence, and
continue to maintain the kind of relationship in that proceeding that is
necessary for that proceeding to conclude in a proper way. One must
wonder whether it is an effective way to get at the problems that are
perceived to exist. I think it is not.
I happen to be in basic disagreement with those who complain there is
something wrong with the number of lawsuits that are instituted. Pre-
sumably a perceived excess of litigation is part of the justification for
having Rule 11. I believe our society is a great society, in part, because
we have access to the courts as we do. I don't think there are very many
people in this country who would want to trade our system for a system
that doesn't provide adequate means for individuals to seek redress for
injuries inflicted on them by others.
We live in a complex society where a lot of people live under very
frustrating circumstances. Government is remote. Virtually everyone
who has a profound impact on an individual's life is remote. Whether
they be individuals who buy securities in the stock market, or buy prod-
ucts in the supermarket, people are dependent on the conduct of others
with whom they have no direct contact. We are far from the horse and
buggy age, when most of the lawsuits arose as a result of one-on-one
transactions.
Commercial conduct has evolved so that people rely on conduct of
unknown third persons to live their lives peacefully, without improper
economic intrusion and in good health. But as communications in-
creased and the legislatures opened the doors to the courtroom, the op-
portunity was afforded to get into the bowels of these third parties, and
to see what was really influencing economic well-being, good health and
peaceable co-existence. And we are still learning. We are learning about
123. See Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal
Rule" On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 680, 717 (1983)
("Often, punishing lawyers will change the atmosphere in which a judge works from one
of cooperation to one that is combatative and less effective in bringing controversies tojust, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions."); Weinstein, Remarks at the Annual Judicial
Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 93 F.R.D. 675, 785 (1981) ("In
my opinion, any system that requires force, that doesn't revolve around the collegial con-
sensus of the bar and the courts about what is right. .. is not working properly.")
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the horrendous impacts of dump sites 24 that are so toxic that they most
probably will give rise to future genetic damage; automobiles that are put
on the road with parts that will cause serious injury or death'2 5 and a
parade of other horribles. It is not easy to get to the bottom of these
situations. But it is very important to give people out there a sense that
there is somebody who will get to the bottom for them--or fight City
Hall for them, if you will. I will leave to Judge Sifton, a story that he
told us at the luncheon yesterday that is on point.
I just don't like what Rule 11 does in this already difficult environ-
ment. I am not going to dwell on personal experiences, but I will tell you
one thing, attacks by lawyer upon lawyer will start off slowly and esca-
late rapidly. You know, lawyers are timid about suing other lawyers.
Make no mistake about it, this kind of motion is just like suing a lawyer.
You are in effect suing a lawyer and trying to get money from that lawyer
and cause that lawyer to be sanctioned. And the more reported decisions
awarding sanctions,1 26 the more we are going to see of these motions.
I have a motion with me that was made against my firm last week, out
in San Francisco, by a major law firm, against which we litigate fre-
quently. I happen to think that law firm is going to get killed with this
motion but that is beside the point. The reason it brought the motion,
you know, is because it goes to its client and it tells its client this motion
is available. It so informs its client because that is its responsibility as an
attorney. And the client who is being sued for fraud says, get the bastard
and use any means available. Find any way you can to get the bastard.
If a decision is obtained awarding sanctions, it is an invitation for the
next ten lawyers to make similar motions and then the ten lead to a hun-
dred motions, which will then lead to thousands of motions and ulti-
mately we are really going to see clogged courtrooms.
124. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985)
(hazardous waste dump in Glenwood Landing, N.Y.); United States v. Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1984) (Love Canal); United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1067-68 (D. Colo. 1985) (Rocky Mountain Arsenal). See
generally E.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6119 (discussing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known as "Superfund"); Comment, Genera-
tor Liability Under Superfund for Clean-up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1229, 1229-80 (1982) (discussing liability under Superfund).
125. See, eg., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 776-78, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 361-62 (1981) (Ford Pinto gas tank explosion); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 369, 161 A.2d 69, 75 (1960) (Plymouth steering system failure);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390-91, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)
(defective wheel).
126. For example, in the Second Circuit, there were seven published opinions that con-
cerned sanctions under the new Rule 11 in 1983. In 1984 there were 32. See Memoran-
dum from Mary Sue Henifin to Standish Forde Medina, Jr., A Preliminary Analis of
Reported Decisions Applying the 1983 Amendments to Rules 11, 16, and 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure app. B, at B-2 to -9 (Aug. 8, 1984) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review). It must also be noted that many sanctions are imposed without
written opinions. See id at 4.
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To another point-why should I, representing a plaintiff filing a law-
suit, be subjected to the vagaries of judges, some of whom can be very
arbitrary and, believe it or not, not very clever. Many judges, like it or
not, don't know what is going on and a lot of them have deep-seated
biases and are out to get particular lawyers. And boy, Rule 11 is some
tool to do it with. Why should any lawyer have to subject him or herself
in front of such judges, in the beginning of the lawsuit, with questions
such as-what did you do to satisfy yourself as to every fact in this
60-page complaint-which was so pleaded because of purported Rule
9(b) particularity requirements.127 If a firm then gets sanctions against it
as my firm did in Goldman v. Belden128 in upstate New York in the fed-
eral district court up there, it is subjected to having that decision cited
against it in forums all over the country. Every time my firm made a
motion for certification of a class, that decision was cited. How much
damage did that do to my firm?
Now let's look at the law firm that made that motion and got the sanc-
tions against us. In its appellate brief before the Second Circuit, cogni-
zant of Rule 11, that law firm wrote the following: "Moreover the
present suit has all the characteristics of a 'strike' suit against which the
Supreme Court warned in Blue Chip Stamps . . . . Plaintiff clearly
hopes that the defense of the suit and particularly the discovery process
will be so demoralizing, intrusive and expensive that his target will agree
to a payoff no matter how unsubstantiated his charges of fraud."129 Hav-
ing libeled all of my partners as "strike suitors," is that not grounds for a
Rule 11 motion? Our adversary made a Rule 11 motion against us and
where was it to end, with a retaliatory Rule 11 motion? What were we to
do? My firm decided-to hell with it, just beat the attack as we did, send
our adversary back home with a reversal and reconfront that same judge
and just go on with business. My question is, however, can business then
continue as usual? Unfortunately, what was injected in the case was
127. See Fed.R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."). There is some sugges-
tion, however, that Rule 9(b) does not apply in federal securities law cases because those
actions are distinguishable from common law fraud cases. See Jackson v. Daniels, [1984-
85 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,045, at 91,207-08 (D.N.M. April 12,
1985).
128. See Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373, 1381-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (imposing
sanctions against plaintiff and his attorneys, Mr. Weiss' firm, for allegedly filing an action
for fraud without foundation), vacated, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985). On appeal, the
Second Circuit found that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim and therefore "the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 cannot stand." Goldman v. Belden, 754
F.2d 1059, 1071-72 (2d Cir. 1985).
129. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 30, Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir.
1985). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-44 (1975) (con-
cerning the Court's fear of "vexatious litigation" which could be instituted by plaintiffs
with weak claims in order to extract settlements). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2974 (1985) (class actions permit litigation in a suit with common
questions when proper joinder is unavailable due to the number of plaintiffs; class actions
permit "plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually").
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poison, and it may not be excisable. It is unfortunate, but true, that a
get-even mentality, not healthy in a litigation, will frequently result.
Making Rule 11 motions is bad, it is evil, and it is going to hurt us all
and adversely affect the judicial process. Our reputations within the
community will not be enhanced and we're are going to rue the day it
was adopted. It can only further erode public confidence in our system
of justice.
